As Kurdish groups consolidate abroad, Washington’s pressure campaign may increasingly rely on domestic fractures
Amid escalating tensions surrounding Iran and the ongoing discussions about potential military strikes by the US, the internal political situation in the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly turbulent. Tehran’s adversaries are considering not only direct military pressure but also a mixed strategy of destabilization involving limited strikes combined with the activation of internal protest movements and ethnic-political factors.
This strategy implies minimizing the duration and scale of military operations and instead relying on internal pressure. In other words, external actions could serve as a trigger for internal processes. In this situation, opposition forces – not just ‘political’ ones (in Iran, and even beyond its borders, no political force has emerged that could position itself as a unified center of non-systemic opposition), but particularly ethnoregional groups – might seize the opportunity to organize large-scale protests reminiscent of a ‘color revolution’. In this scenario, the focus shifts from a military defeat to undermining Iran’s internal resilience.
In such a configuration, the ethnic factor could play a significant role. Iran is a multi-ethnic state, and the Kurdish issue has traditionally been one of the most sensitive issues for the authorities. Tehran’s adversaries in the Middle East (Israel) and in the West (the US) have never concealed the fact that they view the ethnic-political factor as one of the most promising means of pressuring Tehran. The focus is primarily on national minorities that have historically been a sensitive issue for the central government, and whose social discontent may grow into more radical forms of resistance, including guerrilla activities. The Kurds, along with the Arabs, Azerbaijanis, and the Baloch people, are frequently mentioned in this context.
Such reasoning is quite pragmatic: large-scale military operations come with political, financial, and reputational costs, whereas destabilization by means of existing internal divisions can achieve comparable strategic effects with much lower expenses. Within this framework, external pressure – such as sanctions, information campaigns, or limited military actions – functions as a trigger, while the main ‘strike’ occurs from within the country.
During the January protests in Iran, both Israeli and US officials were closely monitoring the behavior of key ethnic groups to assess their mobilization potential. However, the actual situation turned out to be less straightforward than what many Israeli and Western experts had described for decades. This time, the Baloch people and the Arabs, who have traditionally expressed discontent with Tehran’s policies (mainly on socio-economic issues), did not widely engage in protests. Their demonstrations remained limited and did not escalate into a systemic anti-government movement.
The country’s Azerbaijani population (which amounts to around 30 million people, out of Iran’s total population of 90 million) has largely adopted a loyalist stance. Iranian Azerbaijanis took part in public demonstrations supporting Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These meetings were often accompanied by criticism of Reza Pahlavi, who presents himself as the “crown prince.” The memory of his father Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s repressive policies – such as restrictions on minority languages and harsh suppression of dissent – still shapes historical perception and political identity.
In contrast, a different dynamic is emerging in the country’s Kurdish regions. Some of the largest protests in late December occurred within the Kurdish-speaking provinces of Lorestan and Kurdistan. This means that the Kurdish factor can act as a trigger for deeper destabilization. In this context, Iran’s opponents could use the Kurds as a means of destabilization, similar to Syria and Iraq, where Kurdish groups significantly expanded their autonomy and institutional presence amid weakened central authority. In other words, the Kurdish issue is viewed as a particularly sensitive topic for the central authorities, one that may be used as a tool for long-term destabilization, especially when combined with internal protests and external military force or sanctions.
On February 22, five Kurdish organizations operating in the US announced the formation of an alliance called the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan. They expressed their intention to intensify armed resistance against Tehran and their political support for Washington’s actions.
Members of this alliance include the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), which is the Iranian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, and the Xebat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan. This coalition reflects the Kurds’ desire to consolidate resources and coordinate political actions amid the potential transformation of the region’s security architecture.
In a joint statement, the alliance emphasized that its strategic goal is to establish a governance system in Iran based on the “political will of the Kurdish people.” The document referenced the long-standing struggle of the Kurdish movement against centralized governance, stressing the need to revise existing power distribution mechanisms and recognize the national-political rights of the Kurdish population.
The joint statement is not one of protest; rather, it projects the coalition’s stance. It underscores that the role of the Kurds in opposing the current regime will increase, and the “future of Tehran” must be reevaluated in light of possible systemic changes. It also highlights that in the event of a regime change, the Kurdish populace should have the opportunity to determine its own political and legal status within the Iranian state.
From a regional security perspective, the consolidation of Kurdish structures in Iran poses additional risks not only to the country’s internal stability but also to the already fragile security architecture of the Middle East. This is particularly true in border areas, where the ethnic issue is intertwined with other factors: cross-border ties, armed groups, and the accompanying external influences. This may very well be used by the White House for destabilization purposes.
Historical experience indicates that the Kurdish factor is a longstanding element in US foreign policy in the region. Since 2003, Iraqi Kurds have been Washington’s key allies in the Middle East; their support was crucial in launching the campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime. Moreover, Kurdish forces played a significant role in the Syrian conflict, receiving backing and weapons in their fight against radical groups. Over time, Kurdish structures in Syria and Iraq have strengthened their economy, particularly through oil exports from territories under their control.
Today, Iraqi Kurdistan stands as the largest political and territorial entity of the Kurdish people and holds substantial oil reserves (about 45 billion barrels). This not only provides economic stability but also enhances the region’s political influence. The existence of such a quasi-state next to Iran’s Kurdish regions strengthens cross-border ties and creates an alternative center of gravity.
In this context, the Kurdish regions of Iran have emerged as one of the most active areas during protests. There is also speculation that some protest initiatives may receive infrastructure and organizational support from abroad, including from neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan. The recent escalation in Iran’s Kurdish provinces could be seen as another attempt to push through a broader project for autonomy or even statehood, especially with the backing of external partners. The Kurds reside not only in Iraq and Iran but also in Türkiye and Syria, though in each country there is a unique Kurdish identity. However, what unites them is their shared history.
Historical memory is important in this context. The Kurdish uprising in Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution was brutally suppressed, and hopes for autonomy within the new ‘Islamic system’ were dashed. In the decades that followed, there have been occasional tensions in the Kurdish regions of Iran; however, the current protests appear more extensive and organized. We must note that Iran has a special region for its Kurdish population called Kurdistan Province, where the Kurdish language is taught, children can attend Kurdish schools, and Kurdish-language media operate. All of this was unimaginable during the monarchy. However, as the saying goes, “Eating whets the appetite.” Over time, the Kurds sought more privileges; this contradicted the logic of the Iranian authorities – they feared that the more compromises they made, the greater the demands of the Kurds would become. Moreover, this could trigger a ‘domino effect’ that could resonate with other ethnic groups.
Tensions between Kurdish movements and the central government could serve as another tool for Western powers in their multifaceted pressure strategy. In this context, the ethnic-political conflict, in which Kurds play a significant role, may become part of a “divide and conquer” policy – one of the West’s traditional and most successful tools.
The Kurdish factor undoubtedly carries additional symbolic and political weight. The autonomous institutions in Iraqi Kurdistan and the successful ‘institutionalization’ of Kurdish identity in neighboring Iraq set a precedent that many Iranian Kurds view as a potential blueprint for their future. This fuels separatist sentiments in border regions, and, if the central authority weakens, there is a good chance that these sentiments could become more organized.
A potential scenario involving limited strikes aimed at triggering internal turbulence in Iran implies synchronization between external pressure and internal tensions. In this context, the Kurdish factor emerges as a crucial element in the West’s multilayered strategy of exerting pressure on Tehran. While external military action may serve as a trigger, the main escalation will likely occur within Iran’s domestic political landscape.
