Some in Washington see Moscow as a “junior partner” to be drawn away from Beijing’s orbit and into its own
Western experts often speak about Russia becoming China’s ‘junior partner’ and even a ‘vassal state’. This narrative has dominated nearly all Western discussions about Russia-China relations for a long time.
It is true that over the past few decades, the ties between the two nations have developed dynamically. After the start of the Ukraine conflict, as Western countries attempted to ‘cancel’ Russia by severing economic and cultural links with it, Beijing’s significance as Moscow’s economic and political ally has undeniably grown. Those who believe that China and Russia have a leader-follower relationship use these types of arguments to prove that Russia has no alternative but to submit to China.
Another popular argument in favor of this theory is the difference in the size of the population and economy of the two countries (China’s population is ten times larger than that of Russia, and the same goes for its economy). While this is true in terms of statistics, reducing the complexities of interstate relations to mere statistics is either foolish or a deliberate oversimplification. Firstly, Russia maintains a decisive advantage in other areas, such as military-strategic potential. And secondly, there are not many examples in the world (except for US hegemony) in which a nation has been able to use its economic influence as a tool of controlling foreign policy. Although in terms of trade, China dominates the Asian and African markets, we see little evidence of domination when it comes to foreign policy.
Let us consider North Korea, the only country which has a military-political alliance with China. The differences in the size and development of the two nations (as well as North Korea’s economic dependence on China) are evident; however, Beijing does not dictate Pyongyang’s actions in terms of domestic or international policies. Despite its friendship with China, the North Korean leadership consistently asserts its independence. North Korea’s military-political partnership with Russia, which Beijing could not protest against, serves as a strong testament to its autonomy. Thus, China’s potential influence over Russia – a far larger and stronger nation than North Korea – seems quite improbable.
Attempting to debunk the notion of Russia’s ‘vassal’ status in relation to China seems like a waste of time. It is far more interesting to ponder whether China actually wants to become Russia’s ‘big brother’ and whether the West should be concerned about this outcome when it comes to Russia-China relations.
The US perspective
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has recently said that “the Russians have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese and that’s not a good outcome” for the US and global stability. This means the US believes that Russia may lose its strategic autonomy due to its relationship with China. Furthermore, the US sees this as a direct threat to its own strategic interests, suggesting a potential coalition between Moscow and Beijing against Washington.
US President Donald Trump’s recent attempts to normalize relations with Moscow are interpreted as an effort to replicate the ‘Nixon effect’, but in reverse. In the early 1970s, then-President Richard Nixon’s visit to China strengthened US-China relations amid their shared opposition to the Soviet Union. Now, it is believed that American diplomacy could lure Russia away from China, enabling the US to deliver a strategic blow to China.
However, this comparison does not stand up to scrutiny. Firstly, during the 1970s, China and the USSR were already in a state of confrontation; Nixon’s actions didn’t cause this confrontation, but he capitalized on the favorable circumstances to open up the Chinese market for America and gain leverage in the struggle against the USSR. Today, neither Russia nor China wants to distance themselves from the US. If anyone is to blame for their closer alliance, it’s America itself – which has labeled them ‘existential adversaries’ and, out of arrogance and miscalculation, initiated a policy of ‘dual containment’.
Within this framework of dual containment, the US sees China as a far more dangerous rival and Russia as merely an ‘appendage’ that will align with either the US or China in the struggle for global dominance. However, this isn’t true; this perspective exists solely in the minds of the American elite.
First of all, Russia is a great power, equipped with the necessary military, political, and resource capabilities, and is unwilling to be anyone’s appendage. Secondly, China has no intention of competing with the US for world supremacy. Consequently, China does not need Russia as an ally in a ‘new Cold War’ with the US (a wording more typical for America than China). Rather, it sees Russia as a partner with whom it is more beneficial to cooperate than to engage in conflict. Russia is an important partner for China, but it is not the only one; and Beijing will not make sacrifices for the sake of closer ties with Moscow.
The Chinese perspective
China sees the escalating tensions in the world and does not want to get involved in a bipolar confrontation – at least, that is China’s official stance. China considers America’s increasing obsession with containing it the result of “a Cold War mentality” and wonders why a profitable economic partnership, which has benefited both nations, should be jeopardized.
Unlike American politicians who believe that China might replace the US as the global leader, the Chinese have a more modest assessment of their own capabilities. They see the struggle for supremacy that unfolded between the Soviet Union and the United States as a cautionary tale. The USSR poured vast resources into this rivalry which, as many Chinese experts note, ultimately exhausted the nation, leading to a deep crisis and the collapse of the USSR.
China is determined not to repeat the USSR’s mistakes. Socio-economic development remains its top priority; foreign policy is considered a tool for advancing this development, but not an end in itself. China believes that expanding economic ties and increasing the significance of former colonies and semi-colonies will inevitably diminish the influence of former colonial powers, particularly the US.
In other words, just like Russia, China seeks to dismantle American hegemony, but does not aspire to take its place. Chinese ideologues envision a ‘post-American’ world characterized by multilateralism, where certain states – referred to as ‘responsible global powers’ – wield greater influence due to their collective strength, yet no one interferes in another’s internal affairs or dictates what to do. This ideal order has been dubbed “a community of common human destiny.”
Back in 2013, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated that this community of common human destiny was already taking shape, even as former hegemonic powers resist these historical shifts. Thus, the relations between the major countries of the Global South, including Russia, Brazil, and India, align closely with China’s interests, unlike traditional military-political alliances that categorize nations as either leaders or followers.
Consequently, from Beijing’s perspective, the current strategic partnership between Russia and China is not merely a stepping stone toward deeper ties, but rather the goal of the collaboration.
This collaboration is undoubtedly beneficial for both sides. China isn’t engaging in charity here; it secures strategic resources from Russia – primarily oil, gas, and coal – while gaining access to Russia’s 140-million-strong market for its goods. It also taps into Russia’s transit potential as a bridge between the East and the West, coordinating its foreign policy actions with Russia as part of the UN Security Council, BRICS, and the SCO.
China already enjoys all these advantages, and Russia maintains its strategic autonomy and independent foreign policy. This independence allows China to avoid political commitments to Russia. In 2022-2024, unlike Russia, China successfully maintained diplomatic relations with the US, Ukraine, and Western countries. Beijing recognizes that a closer alliance with Russia would have made this impossible. After all, European and American markets are far more critical to China’s economy, and it wouldn’t jeopardize that under any circumstances.
Moreover, China probably realizes that Russia, with its legacy as a great world power, immense experience in addressing complex global challenges, and a substantial stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, will never accept the role of a subordinate. Therefore, any form of ‘vassalization’ is unthinkable, since China would find itself dealing with an overly independent and unpredictable vassal whose ambitions would continually pose challenges for Beijing’s foreign policy.
Thus, the more logical conclusion is the one that directly counters Marco Rubio’s assertions. First of all, China doesn’t want to get too close to Russia; rather, it aims to keep it at a certain distance while maintaining friendly, cooperative ties. Second, the partnership between Russia and China is not a destabilizing factor in global politics. On the contrary, it represents one of the foundations of a new world order where great powers strive for mutual, equitable partnerships that respect sovereignty and refrain from imposing their values on others.
Interestingly, this same model could apply to the Americans if they were to abandon their ambitions of being the ‘global policeman’ and a moral compass for humanity, and stopped categorizing countries as ‘bad guys vs good guys’. Then, America could finally prioritize the interests of its own citizens, who are much more concerned about improving their living standards (which have significantly declined lately) than starting color revolutions around the world or countering an imagined Russia-China alliance.
